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INTRODUCTION 
In 1964, Congress passed comprehensive legislation aimed at 
eradicating discrimination in employment, public accommodations, 
public facilities, public schools, and federal benefit programs.1 Title 
VII of this Act directed its aim specifically at stamping out prejudice 
in employment.2 Four years later, the Supreme Court resurrected3 the 
1. See generally Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (1994)). 
2. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994). 
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provisions of § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866,4 which, among other 
things, protects citizens, regardless of race or color, in their right to 
"make and enforce [employment] contracts."5 Together, Title VII and 
§ 1981 serve as the primary legal bases for challenging racially dis­
criminatory actioris by private employers. More than thirty years after 
the passage of Title VII and the Court's resurrection of § 1981, 
though, society continues to feel the lingering effects of America's his­
tory of slavery and segregation in the field of employment.6 A study by 
the Urban Institute in the late 1980s and early 1990s determined that 
black job applicants continued to face discriminatory treatment at all 
levels of the hiring process.7 In view of the continuing effects of dis­
crimination in employment, a number of civil rights organizations 
around the country have employed testing as a means of ferreting out 
discrimination in the hiring process.8 
"[A] 'tester' is an individual who, without the intent to accept an 
offer of employment, poses as a job applicant in order to gather evi­
dence of discriminatory hiring practices."9 The testing process usually 
involves the dispatch of pairs of equally credentialed candidates, one 
black and one white, to job interviews.10 Organizations that conduct 
employment testing ensure equivalency within the pairs by selecting 
3. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 437 (1968) ("'The fact that . . .  [the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866) lay partially dormant for many years cannot be held to diminish its force 
today.'" (quoting the oral argument of the Attorney General)). 
4. Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-82 (1994). 
5. 42 U.S.C. § 1981; see also Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459-60 
(1976) ("Although this Court has not specifically so held, it is well settled among the Federal 
Courts of Appeals - and we now join them - that § 1981 affords a federal remedy against 
discrimination in private employment on the basis of race." (internal notes omitted)). 
6. Daniel M. Tardiff, Knocking on the Courtroom Door: Finally an Answer from Within 
for Employment Testers, 32 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 909, 909-10 (2001). 
7. Michael J. Yelnosky. Filling an Enforcement Void: Using Testers to Uncover and 
Remedy Discrimination in Hiring for Lower-Skilled, Entry-Level Jobs, 26 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 403, 410 (1993); see also MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER ET AL., OPPORTUNITIES 
DENIED, OPPORTUNITIES DIMINISHED: RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN HIRING 37-66 (1991) 
(laying out the findings of the Urban Institute study). 
8. Shannon E. Brown, Tester Standing Under Title VII, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1117, 
1119-20 (1992). 
9. Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Sec. Servs., 222 F.3d 289, 291 n.l (7th Cir. 2000) (citing 
Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 370, 374 (1982)). 
10. Brown, supra note 8, at 1120. The literature and case law in this area have to date 
focused upon the use of testing in the context of discrimination on the basis of race or color. 
Testing, however, may prove valuable to ferret out discrimination on the basis of national 
origin, sex, and other characteristics as well. See, e.g., Chicago Area Council of Boy Scouts of 
Am. v. City of Chicago Comm'n on Human Relations, 748 N.E.2d 759, 770 (111. App. Ct. 
2001) (testing for sexual orientation discrimination); Molovinsky v. Fair Employment Coun­
cil of Greater Wash., Inc., 683 A.2d 142, 146 (D.C. 1996) (testing for sex discrimination); 
Elizabeth E. Theran, "Free To Be Arbitrary and . . .  Capricious": Weight-Based Discrimina­
tion and the Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 
113, 163 (2001) (testing for weight-based discrimination). 
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testers with similar personalities and providing them with similar 
backgrounds, credentials, and interview techniques.11 These testers re­
port back regarding their experiences in the interview process, and the 
organization analyzes these reports, combined with the outcomes of 
the interview process, to determine whether the employer is engaging 
in discriminatory hiring practices.12 The information provided by these 
testers can constitute invaluable evidence of discrimination in the job 
market. Whereas the single applicant can provide only anecdotal evi­
dence regarding her experience, testing provides comparative evi­
dence that can strengthen an individual plaintiff's initial complaint un­
der Title VII or § 1981.13 
While testing serves as a useful tool in the fight against employ­
ment discrimination, many employers have challenged the practice as 
unethical, deceptive, detrimental, and costly.14 They argue that testing 
increases the costs of hiring, as employers must expend valuable inter­
viewing resources on candidates who have no interest in actual em­
ployment.15 Whereas the costs associated with finding each qualified 
candidate may be limited in some industries, for example, food serv­
ice, these costs can be quite high in areas such as professional services. 
In these areas, employers spend significant monies to attract each can­
didate; the loss of a qualified applicant to maintain a spot for a covert 
tester can result in an inability to fill the spot with a suitably qualified 
candidate.16 Moreover, employers have characterized testing as en­
trapment, because testers, like undercover agents, utilize false creden­
tials to misrepresent themselves to the intended object of the entrap­
ment.17 
11. Brown, supra note 8, at 1120. 
12. Id. at 1120-21. 
13. See Yelnosky, supra note 7, at 414; see also Michelle Landever, Note, Tester Standing 
in Employment Discrimination Cases Under 42 U.S.C. § 1 981, 41 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 381, 382 
(1 993). 
14. Tardiff, supra note 6, at 956 ;  see also EEOC's Endorsement of Testers in Bias Cases 
Could Lead to Abuses, Employers' Group Charges, 31 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 31,  at 
A-10 (Feb. 14, 1 991) (noting views of the Equal Employment Advisory Council, an umbrella 
organization of large employers, that employment testing amounts to "trickery and deceit," 
"fraud," and "deception"). 
15. Tardiff, supra note 6, at 956 ;  see also EEOC's Endorsement of Testers in Bias Cases 
Could Lead to Abuses, Employers' Group Charges, supra note 14. 
16. Yelnosky, supra note 7, at 414-15; see also Equal Employment Advisory Council 
Letter on Proposed Testing Policy at EEOC, 31 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 31, at E-1 (Feb. 
14, 1 991) : 
[The EEOC's tester policy] ignores all the time employers will waste and expense they will 
incur in interviewing, evaluating, testing, and checking the references of persons who have 
no real interest in employment. It also fails to consider the opportunities that will be lost 
when employers discover that their top-ranked candidates are testers only after it is too late 
to bring back other qualified candidates who had a sincere interest in being hired. 
17. Tardiff, supra note 6, at 956; see also EEOC's Endorsement of Testers in Bias Cases 
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These policy arguments regarding the merits of employment test­
ing, though valuable to social discourse about the proper means of 
achieving a colorblind society, fail to reach the primary legal question 
currently surrounding employment testing - the question of standing 
for employment testers. The doctrine of standing encompasses two 
distinct sets of limitations upon the ability of prospective plaintiffs to 
maintain discrimination suits in federal court: judicially-created pru­
dential requirements18 and constitutionally-mandated limitations.19 
The circuits that have considered whether testers can meet either. the 
constitutional or prudential standing requirements to sue for damages 
or prospective relief2° have split, failing to achieve consensus on the 
ability of testers to satisfy the standing requirements under either Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196421 or 42 U.S.C. § 1981.22 The Fourth 
Circuit has determined that testers do not possess standing under Title 
VIl,23 while the Seventh Circuit has found the requisite basis for 
standing under the statute.24 The D.C. Circuit has also held against 
standing for testers under Title VII, but, so far, only with regard to 
their ability to seek prospective relief.25 With regard to standing under 
Could Lead to Abuses, Employers' Group Charges, supra note 14 at A-10; Alex Young K. 
Oh, Using Employment Testers to Detect Discrimination: An Ethical and Legal Analysis, 7 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 473, 498 (1993). 
18. The prudential standing requirements recognized by the Court derive not from 
Article III of the United States Constitution but rather from concerns about judicial self­
governance. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975). These self-imposed standing require­
ments prevent plaintiffs from asserting the rights of third-parties, id., litigating generalized 
grievances common to either all citizens or a broad class of citizens, id. at 499, or seeking 
judicial intervention in an area that is not "arguably within the zone of interests to be pro­
tected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question." Ass'n of Data 
Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970). These requirements, though, may 
be waived by express congressional action. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 163 (1997) 
("Congress legislates against the background of our prudential standing doctrine, which ap­
plies unless it is expressly negated." (citations omitted)). 
19. The Court also recognizes three constitutionally-based limitations on the ability of a 
plaintiff to maintain standing before the Court. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 
560-61 (1992). These limitations require that the plaintiff show that she has suffered an in­
jury cognizable under the constitutional or statutory provision cited as the basis for relief, 
that her injury can be causally linked to the alleged actions of the defendant, and that a fa­
vorable decision by the court would redress her injury. Id. (These requirements are com­
monly referred to as injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability.) Unlike with the prudential 
requirements, Congress lacks the power to abrogate these standing hurdles. Raines v. Byrd, 
521 U.S. 811, 820 n.3 (1997). 
20. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1238 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "prospective" as "effec­
tive or operative in the future"); id. at 1293 (defining "relief' as "redress or benefit, 
esp[ecially] equitable in nature (such as an injunction or specific performance) that a party 
asks of a court"). 
21. 42 u.s.c. § 2000e (1994). 
22. 42 u.s.c. § 1981 (1994). 
23. See Sledge v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 585 F.2d 625, 641 (4th Cir. 1978). 
24. Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Sec. Servs., 222 F.3d 289, 298-99 (7th Cir. 2000). 
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§ 1981, the Seventh and D.C. Circuits have ruled against testers,26 
while the Eleventh and Third Circuits have accorded testers standing 
to pursue their claims.27 
This Note argues that, while employment testing may serve a laud­
able purpose in identifying discrimination and in gathering evidence of 
discriminatory treatment, employment testers do not meet the re­
quirements for standing under either Title VII or § 1981. Part I main­
tains that employment testers do not suffer the requisite injury-in­
fact28 necessary for standing to seek compensatory damages under 
Title VII and further that testers cannot meet the redressability29 re­
quirements for prospective relief. Part II contends that testers also 
may not seek standing under § 1981, as they fall outside the zone of 
interests30 that Congress sought to protect with the statute. Finally, 
Part III argues that the purposes of the standing doctrine - to main­
tain proper respect for separation of powers between the coequal 
branches of the federal govemment31 - require that standing for em­
ployment testers be granted not by judicial fiat but only through con­
gressional action. This Note concludes that employment testers cannot 
satisfy the standing requirements to pursue suits under either Title VII 
or § 1981; moreover, in light of the courts' responsibility to defer to 
Congress as creator of statutory bases for standing, any close question 
regarding tester standing should be resolved against a recognition of 
standing. 
25. Fair Employment Council of Greater Wash., Inc., v. BMC Mktg. Corp., 28 F.3d 
1268, 1275 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
26. Kyles, 222 F.3d at 302; BMC Mktg. Corp., 28 F.3d at 1271. 
27. Watts v. Boyd Properties, 758 F.2d 1482, 1485 (11th Cir. 1985); Meyers v. Pennypack 
Woods Home Ownership Ass'n, 559 F.2d 894, 898 (3d Cir. 1977). 
28. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (defining injury-in-fact as 
"an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) 
actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical" (internal citations and quotations omit­
ted)); id. at 560 n.1 ("By particularized, we mean that the injury must affect the plaintiff in a 
personal and individual way."). 
29. Id. at 561 (noting that, in order to meet the redressability requirement, "it must be 
likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable deci­
sion" (internal quotations and citations omitted)). 
30. Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970) ("The ques­
tion of standing is different. It concerns, apart from the 'case' or 'controversy' test, the ques­
tion whether the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the 
zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in 
question."); see also 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW§ 3-19, at 
446-47 (3d ed. 2000): 
[T]o say that a particular plaintiffs claim does not fall within the zone of interests of a given 
constitutional provision is another way of saying that the right claimed is one possessed not 
by the party asserting it, but rather by others, and that the plaintiff will not have standing to 
assert a violation of these rights of absent third parties, whose claims would fall within the 
applicable zone of interests. 
31. See generally Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the 
Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881 (1983). 
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I. EMPLOYMENT TESTER STANDING UNDER TITLE VII 
This Part contends that employment testers fail to meet the mini­
mum requirements necessary for standing to seek either compensatory 
damages or prospective relief under Title VII. Section I.A argues that 
employment testers do not suffer the injury-in-fact necessary to pursue 
Title VII compensatory damages, while Section I.B maintains that 
employment testers cannot meet the redressability prong essential to 
achieve standing for prospective relief. 
A. Injury-in-Fact and Compensatory Damages 
Though most plaintiffs face the prospect of satisfying both the con­
stitutional and prudential standing hurdles,32 in the Title VII context, 
Congress has waived the prudential standing requirements33 so that 
litigants may assert standing to the "outermost limits of Article IIl."34 
Congress, however, may not waive the Article III standing require­
ments.35 Thus, in order to maintain standing under Title VII, employ­
ment testers must plead sufficient facts to demonstrate injury-in-fact, 
causation, and redressability.36 The injury alleged by employment test­
ers, discriminatory treatment at the hands of an employer or employ­
ment agency, meets the causation requirement, as the injury can be di­
rectly traced to the alleged actions of the defendant.37 In addition, 
taking into consideration the purpose of compensatory damages under 
Title VII, to provide a "meaningful monetary remed[y] for all forms of 
workplace harassment,"38 a favorable damage award could redress the 
alleged injury of an employment tester.39 Nevertheless, while the in-
32. See supra note 18 (describing the prudential standing requirements). 
33. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1994); see also Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 
205, 209 (1972) (finding, in context of suit under Title VIII, that "person claiming to be ag­
grieved" language - present in both Title VIII and Title VII - indicates congressional in­
tent to extend standing to Article III limits). 
34. Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Sec. Servs., 222 F.3d 289, 295 (7th Cir. 2000); accord Spann v. 
Colonial Village, Inc., 899 F.2d 24, 27 (D.C. Cir. 1990); EEOC v. Mississippi College, 626 
F.2d 477, 482 (5th Cir. 1980). 
35. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820 n.3 (1997); Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. , 
397 U.S. at 154; see also Doe v. Nat'I Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 199 F.3d 146, 153 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(noting, in the context of the Americans with Disabilities Act, that Congress may not, "by 
statute alone," confer standing absent "actual injury"). 
36. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992); see also supra note 19 
(describing the Article III standing requirements). 
37. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. 
38. Statement of President George Bush upon Signing S. 1745 (Civil Rights Act of 
1991), 27 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1701 (Nov.25, 1991). 
39. Compensatory damages under Title VII are provided under the terms of 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1981a(b) (1994), which provides for punitive damages in cases where the plaintiff proves 
"malice" or "reckless indifference" and for compensatory damages capped based upon the 
size, in terms of number of employees, of the defending firm. See also RESTATEMENT 
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jury alleged by an employment tester satisfies both the causation and 
redressability prongs of the Article III standing requirements, this Part 
demonstrates that employment testers do not suffer an injury-in-fact 
cognizable under Title VII. 
1 .  Umbrella of Statutory Protection 
In order to satisfy the injury-in-fact aspect of the Article III 
standing, employment testers must show the invasion of a legal right 
created either by the Constitution or a statute.40 Because no constitu­
tional provision, absent congressional action, directly provides protec­
tion against private discriminatory action in employment, the 
Constitution itself cannot provide an independent foundation for em­
ployment tester standing.41 Pursuant to its power under the Commerce 
Clause, however, Congress may make private discrimination unlawful 
in the economic realm.42 Nevertheless, in creating statutory rights, the 
invasion of which would create standing, "Congress must at the very 
least identify the injury it seeks to vindicate and relate the injury to the 
class of persons entitled to bring suit."43 In crafting Title VII, Congress 
failed to create a specific statutory interest that would protect testers;44 
Title VII, by its very terms, extends its protection only to those seek­
ing employment.45 Employment testers do not seek employment; 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 903 (1977) (" 'Compensatory damages' are the damages awarded to a 
person as compensation, indemnity or restitution for harm sustained by him."); id. at§ 905 
(noting that compensatory damages may properly be awarded for nonpecuniary, emotional 
harms). 
40. TRIBE, supra note 30, § 3-16, at 400-01: 
First, a court must ask whether the injury claimed by the plaintiff qualifies as the type of 
harm that satisfies Article III. For example, a person subject to criminal prosecution, or 
faced with its imminent prospect, has clearly established the requisite 'injury in fact' to op­
pose such prosecution by asserting any relevant constitutional (or other federal) rights. (em­
phasis added). 
41. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440 (1968) (determining that Congress 
may give effect to the provisions of the Thirteenth Amendment but failing to find a basis for 
a private right of action within the text of the Thirteenth Amendment itself); Civil Rights 
Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) ("Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject­
matter of the [Fourteenth] [A]mendment."); accord United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 
599-600 (2000) (reaffirming the central holding of the Civil Rights Cases that the Fourteenth 
Amendment does not reach private conduct); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 512-14 
(1975) (finding that plaintifrs claim of injury to their ability to enjoy "the benefits of living in 
a racially and ethnically integrated community" was not judicially cognizable under Article 
III absent a statutory basis). 
42. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 300-01 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. 
United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964); see also Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 
n.3 (1973) ("Congress may enact statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates 
standing, even though no injury would exist without the statute." (citations omitted)). 
43. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
44. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2) (1994). 
45. See id. 
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rather, they seek information about a particular employer's hiring 
practices.46 Whether adverse or not, the action taken by the employer 
fulfills the tester's objectives by providing information about the em­
ployer's hiring practices.47 Any injury suffered by the tester as a result 
of a discriminatory hiring decision does not fall within Title VII's um­
brella of statutory protection - an umbrella intended to protect indi­
viduals in their pursuit of employment opportunities.48 
Housing testers, on the other hand, possess standing under Title 
VIII49 to pursue claims for discriminatory treatment in the sale or 
rental of property precisely because Congress created a specific right 
in all individuals to be free from misrepresentations about the avail­
ability of housing.50 Title VIII provides that "[it shall be unlawful] [t]o 
represent to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, 
familial status, or national origin that any dwelling is not available for 
inspection, sale, or rental when such dwelling is in fact so available."51 
In Havens Realty Corporation v. Coleman,52 the Supreme Court relied 
upon this specific statutory language to find that Congress had created 
a particular statutory right under which housing testers could claim 
standing.53 The Court founded its decision to accord standing to hous­
ing testers upon the injury-in-fact suffered when a tester receives mis­
information about the availability of housing, misinformation made 
illegal by § 804(d) of Title VIII.54 In fact, the Court noted that the 
housing tester suffers an "injury in precisely the form that the statute 
was intended to guard against."55 Not only did Congress create such a 
46. Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Sec. Servs., 222 F.3d 289, 292 n.1 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing 
Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 370, 374 (1982)). 
47. Id.; see also Brown, supra note 8, at 1120-21. 
48. Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc., 657 F. Supp. 1022, 1032 (M.D. Ga. 
1987) ("[H]e . . .  would be nothing more than a test plaintiff who never intending to accept 
employment with Woodmen, he has not been - could not have been - damaged by their 
failure to hire."). But see Kyles, 222 F.3d at 300 (noting that the emotional effects of dis­
criminatory treatment are "cognizable and compensable harms" under Title VII); 
Molovinsky v. Fair Employment Council of Greater Wash. Inc., 683 A.2d 142, 146 (D.C. 
1996) (finding that a local human rights ordinance, like Title Vil, creates a general right to 
be free of discrimination). 
49. 42 u.s.c. § § 3601-3631 (1994). 
50. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d) (1994); Havens Realty Corp., 455 U.S. at 373. 
51. 42 u.s.c. § 3604(d). 
52. 455 U.S. 363 (1982). 
53. Id. at 373 ("Congress . . .  conferred on all 'persons' a legal right to truthful informa­
tion about available housing."); accord Village of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521, 1526 
(7th Cir. 1990); see also Steven G. Anderson, Tester Standing under Title VII: A Rose by Any 
Other Name, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 1217, 1251-1252 (1992). 
54. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d); Havens Realty Corp., 455 U.S. at 373. 
55. Havens Realty Corp. , 455 U.S. at 373; accord Fair Employment Council of Greater 
Wash., Inc., v. BMC Mktg. Corp., 28 F.3d 1268, 1271-72 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ("Congress had 
clearly conferred a cause of action on the [housing] testers [under] § 804(d)."); cf. Lujan v. 
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specific right in Title VIII, but Congress also explicitly recognized the 
role of testing in the Title VIII statutory scheme, granting to the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development the authority to 
contract with private groups to perform housing testing for investiga­
tive purposes.56 
In crafting Title VII, however, Congress not only failed to create a 
broad statutory right in the employment field comparable to the "right 
to truthful information" enacted in Title VIII57 but also neglected to 
recognize a role for testing in the administration of its statutory 
scheme.58 In relevant part, Title VII states: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to fail or 
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate 
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi­
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's [mem­
bership in a protected class] ... or to limit, segregate, or classify his em­
ployees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or 
tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise 
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's 
[membership in a protected class].59 
While the language of Title VII aims broadly at discrimination in em­
ployment, the statute contains no specific statutory right to truthful in­
formation regarding the availability of employment opportunities.60 
Rather, the statute protects those individuals who seek employment.61 
On the statute's face, the injury-in-fact necessary for standing under 
Title VII stems from the loss of an opportunity to be employed or the 
loss of employment opportunities within the context of one's current 
employment.62 
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Congress has the 
power to define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or con­
troversy where none existed before . . . .  "). 
56. 42 U.S.C. § 3616a(b)(2) (1994): 
The Secretary shall use funds made available under this subsection to conduct, through con­
tracts with private nonprofit fair housing enforcement organizations, a range of investigative 
and enforcement activities designed to - (A) carry out testing and other activities in accor­
dance with subsection (b)(l) of this section, including building the capacity for housing in­
vestigative activities in unserved or underserved areas. 
57. Havens Realty Corp., 455 U.S. at 373. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d) (1994) (includ­
ing prohibition on misrepresenting the availability of housing to anyone), with 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-2(a)(l)-(2) (1994) (failing to include such protection for employment applicants). 
58. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 3616a(b)(2) (including specific mention of testing in Title VIII 
statutory scheme), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994) (failing to mention testing of this sort 
within Title VII). 
59. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l)-(2); see also id. at§ 2000e-2(b) (granting the same protec-
tion to protected class members from discrimination by employment agencies). 
60. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. 
61. Id. at§ 2000e-2(a)(l)-(2). 
62. Anderson, supra note 53, at 1258 ("If strict standing rules control, Title VII testers 
may not possess the credentials that courts have required for adjudication."); cf. Trafficante 
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Of course, the text of Title VII includes the term "applicant."63 
Taken out of context, this term could be read to include employment 
testers, for they act as applicants in order to accomplish their objec­
tives. Nevertheless, such a reading would ignore a central canon of 
statutory construction, "that the meaning of a word cannot be deter­
mined in isolation, but must be drawn from the context in which it is 
used."64 Taking a holistic view of the language of Title VII, not only 
does the prepositional phrase "for employment" follow the term "ap­
plicant," but "applicant" also nests among six mentions of "employee" 
or "employment."65 The term "applicant" cannot be removed from the 
overall context of employment, or more precisely, the necessity of the 
applicant to actually be seeking employment.66 Moreover, the unlawful 
employment practice - limiting, segregating, or classifying employees 
or applicants on an impermissible basis - must "deprive or tend to 
deprive" the applicant of "employment opportunities."67 Testers 
plainly do not fit within this overall textual context; the employment 
tester's only employment relationship stems not from a relationship 
with the employer with whom she interviews but rather from her em­
ployment relationship with the testing organization. The employer's 
refusal to hire, thus, does not and cannot diminish the employment 
opportunities of the tester.68 
v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 212 (1972) (White, J., concurring) (noting that, absent 
the specific congressional creation of a statutory right under Title VIII, he "would have great 
difficulty in concluding that petitioners' complaint in this case presented a case or contro­
versy within the jurisdiction of the District Court under Art. III of the Constitution"); 
Village of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521, 1526 (7th Cir. 1990) (noting that standing for 
housing testers "is, as an original matter, dubious"); Dash T. Douglas, Standing on Shaky 
Ground: Stancling Under the Fair Housing Act, 34 AKRON L. REV. 613, 616 (2001) ("[O]n its 
face, the standing of [housing] testers is questionable. They have no intent to rent or pur­
chase a home or apartment when they encounter the discrimination." (notes omitted)). 
63. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l)-(2). 
64. Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993) (citations omitted); see also United 
States Nat'! Bank of Or. v. lndep. Ins. Agents of Am., 508 U.S. 439, 454-55 (1993) (quoting 
NLRB v. Federbush Co., 121 F.2d 954, 957 (2d Cir. 1941)) ("(T]ext consists of words living 'a 
communal existence' . . .  the meaning of each word informing the others and 'all in the ag­
gregate tak[ing] their purport from the setting in which they are used.' "). 
65. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l)-(2). 
66. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (extending statutory protection to "applicants for em­
ployment" (emphasis added)); see also supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text. 
67. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2). This term has engendered no debate in the case law as to 
its meaning, and Title VII itself fails to provide a specific definition of "employment oppor­
tunities." See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994); cf 29 U.S.C. § 630 (1994) (failing to provide a spe­
cific definition of "employment opportunities" in the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act); 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (1994) (failing to provide a specific definition of "employment op­
portunities" in the Americans with Disabilities Act). For the purposes of this Note, "em­
ployment opportunity" has been interpreted simply to mean the opportunity to be em­
ployed. 
68. See Sledge v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 585 F.2d 625, 641 (4th Cir. 1978) ("Such 'test' plain­
tiffs are not, of course, harmed by a refusal to hire since they are not seriously interested in 
the job for which they apply."); see also Lea v. Cone Mills Corp., 438 F.2d 86, 88-89 (4th Cir. 
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2. Pro-Standing Policy Arguments: Begging the Question 
Although Title VII, especially when read in comparison with Title 
VIII, does not, by its terms, create a specific statutory right protecting 
employment testers, advocates for recognizing standing for testers 
contend that the broad policy goals behind the nation's civil rights 
laws favor recognizing standing in this context.69 Specifically, these 
supporters argue that a broad reading of the Supreme Court's holding 
in Havens Realty and congressional intent behind Title VII favor 
finding a statutory basis for tester standing within Title VII. 
Both the Seventh Circuit and the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission ("EEOC") have found that the Supreme Court's ruling in 
Havens Realty affirmatively answers the question of whether employ­
ment testers are entitled to standing under Title VII.70 In granting 
standing to employment testers, the Seventh Circuit in Kyles v. J.K. 
Guardian Security Services71 determined that, while Title VII did not 
contain a provision similar to the Title VIII provision relied upon by 
the Havens Realty court, "the logic of Havens" still supported a ruling 
in favor of the testers.72 The court reasoned that Havens Realty em­
braces standing for testers that " 'were treated in a racially discrimina­
tory fashion, even though they sustained no harm beyond the dis­
crimination itself.' "73 The EEOC similarly has noted that the injury 
necessary for standing under Havens Realty "is disparate treatment 
based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, rather than the 
1971) (affirming district court judgment that plaintiff testers were not entitled to relief in the 
form of backpay); cf Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc., 657 F. Supp. 1022, 1032 
(M.D. Ga. 1987) ("A plaintiff whose primary purpose in interviewing for a job is to create 
the basis for a Title VII EEOC charge and lawsuit, is not the bona fide applicant for a job 
that he must be to establish a prima facie case."); Allen v. Vaughns, 538 F. Supp. 833, 843 
(D. Md. 1982), aff d, 737 F.2d 1299 (4th Cir. 1984) (finding that bona fide application neces­
sary to make out a prima facie case of employment discrimination under Title VII). 
69. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, WHETHER "TESTERS" CAN 
FILE CHARGES AND LITIGATE CLAIMS OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, Policy Guid­
ance 915.002, at Section III.A.I (1996), available at http:l/www.eeoc.gov/docs/testers.html 
[hereinafter EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE} ("Standing is generally interpreted broadly 
under employment discrimination laws to achieve the statutory goal of equal employment 
opportunity."); Anderson, supra note 53, at 1236: 
Congress's objective in enacting Title VII is plain from the language of the statute . . . .  The 
remedies provision of Title VII accords the right to a private cause of action to any 'person 
claiming to be aggrieved' ... .  [S]cholars assert that the Act is aimed more expansively at re­
dressing job discrimination in general. 
70. Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Sec. Servs., 222 F.3d 289, 298-99 (7th Cir. 2000); EEOC 
ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 69, at Section III.A. 
71. Kyles, 222 F.3d 289. 
72. Id. at 297-98. 
73. Id. at 297 (quoting Village of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521, 1527 (7th Cir. 
1990)). 
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loss of employment or housing."74 Taking this broad view of the 
Havens Realty holding, both the Seventh Circuit and the EEOC have 
found that "humiliation, embarrassment, and like injuries" resulting 
from discriminatory treatment and suffered by testers represent ac­
tionable harms under Title VIl.75 
The Seventh Circuit and the EEOC, however, base this argument 
for standing upon a cursory and overbroad view of the Supreme 
Court's holding in Havens Realty.  Private discriminatory action, even 
where it leads to embarrassment or humiliation, is not actionable un­
der federal law absent a proper statutory basis.76 In fact, the Court in 
Havens Realty relied upon specific statutory language in Title VIII to 
find a basis for according standing to housing testers.77 Admitting that 
Title VII does not create a specific statutory interest that would pro­
tect testers, the Seventh Circuit instead noted that the discriminatory 
treatment of an employment tester creates an injury-in-fact by limiting 
not only the tester's employment opportunities but also those of all 
other minority applicants.78 The relevant . language of Title VII, 
though, emphasizes the opportunities available to a specific individual, 
requiring a relationship between the employer and a specific employee 
or applicant.79 The statutory text does not contemplate the unsubstan­
tiated and conjectural prospective employment opportunities of other 
imaginary applicants.80 Absent a more concrete foothold for statutory 
standing under Title VII, the logic followed by the Court in Havens 
Realty remains inapposite to the employment tester context.81 While 
both the Seventh Circuit and the EEOC have tried to effectuate 
Congress's goals of eradicating discrimination, they have done so in 
74. EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 69, at Section IIl.A.2. 
75. Kyles, 222 F.3d at 300; see also EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 69, at 
Section 111.A.3 (noting that testers may suffer "stigmatization" and are marked with a 
"badge of inferiority") (quoting Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 413 n.1 (1975) (White, J., dis­
senting)); Anderson, supra note 53, at 1267 ("[Testers] may claim injury from being denied 
the benefits of a work environment free of discrimination."); cf. TRIBE, supra note 30, § 3-16, 
at 404 ("The legal interest impaired . . .  need not be tangible or economic."). 
76. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
77. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373 (1982); see also Trafficante v. 
Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 212 (1972} (White, J., concurring). 
78. Kyles, 222 F.3d at 298. 
79. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a}(l}-(2) (2000} (making unlawful, inter alia, an employer's 
failure or refusal to hire "any individual," which requires that the employer have a relation­
ship with a specific individual about whom a hiring decision can be made). 
80. Id. 
81. See Havens Realty Corp., 455 U.S. at 373. 
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the absence of a statutory basis for recognizing that standing82 and, in 
doing so, have violated standing doctrine.83 
Of course, Title VII, as part of Congress's legislative program to 
attack discrimination throughout society, may be read broadly to ac­
cord wide protection to victims of discriminatory treatment.84 In 
crafting the Civil Rights Act of 1964, individual members of Congress 
expressed in grand terms their intent to eradicate discrimination 
throughout American society.85 In Kyles, the Seventh Circuit re­
sponded to these sentiments in upholding standing for employment 
testers, finding that, in constructing the language of Title VII, 
"[Congress] created a broad substantive right that extends far beyond 
the simple refusal or failure to hire."86 The Kyles court noted that Title 
VII, in taking broad aim at discrimination in the employment sector, 
permits individuals to sue for statutory violations as private attorneys 
general and signals Congress's desire to extend standing under Title 
82. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d) (1994) (including prohibition on misrepresenting the 
availability of housing to anyone), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l)-(2) (1994) (failing to in­
clude such protection for employment applicants). 
83. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text. Even the broadest interpretations of 
standing under Title VIII, recognizing standing to pursue causes of action for the loss of the 
benefits of living in an integrated community, are inapposite to the tester context. See 
Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 113-14 (1979); Trafficante v. Metro. 
Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 210, 212 (1972). The Gladstone and Trafficante decisions recog­
nized an injury-in-fact under Title VIII, where the plaintiff was directly injured as a member 
of the community in which residential segregation was occurring. Id. An employment tester's 
injury, if any, does not even come within this broader view of injury-in-fact under the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, as a tester is not and will not be a member of the "community" in which 
the alleged discrimination is occurring, those applicants and employees directly affected in 
their employment opportunities by a particular employer's adverse and discriminatory em­
ployment actions. Cf Havens Realty Corp. , 455 U.S. at 377 ("It is indeed implausible to ar­
gue that petitioners' alleged acts of discrimination could have palpable effects throughout 
the entire Richmond metropolitan area . . . .  Our cases have upheld standing based on the 
effects of discrimination only within a 'relatively compact neighborhood.' " (emphasis in 
original)). 
84. Clayton v. White Hall Sch. Dist., 875 F.2d 676, 679 (8th Cir. 1989) ("Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 is to be accorded a liberal construction in order to carry out the 
purpose of Congress to eliminate the inconvenience, unfairness, and humiliation of racial 
discrimination.'' (internal citations and quotations omitted)); EEOC ENFORCEMENT 
GUIDANCE, supra note 69, at Section III.A.1; Leroy D. Clark, Employment Discrimination 
Testing: Theories of Standing and a Reply to Professor Yelnosky, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 
1, 19 (1994). 
85. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 88-914, pt. 2, at l, 30 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2517 (statements of Rep. McCulloch): 
Aside from the political and economic considerations, however, we believe in the creation of 
job equality because it is the right thing to do. We believe in the inherent dignity of man .... 
All vestiges of inequality based solely on race must be removed in order to preserve our 
democratic society, to maintain our country's leadership, and to enhance mankind. 
Id. at 2487; 110 CONG. REC. 12,619 (1964) (statements of Sen. Muskie) (remarking that the 
Act would finally allow the Nation to begin to achieve the ideals expressed in the Preamble 
to the Constitution). 
86. Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Sec. Srvs., 222 F.3d 289, 298 (7th Cir. 2000). 
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VII to the limits of Article IIl.87 Moreover, employment testers who 
face discriminatory treatment at the hands of employers or employ­
ment agencies experience the lingering vestiges of the once institu­
tionalized discrimination that Congress sought to eradicate through its 
civil rights legislation.88 Each of these factors contributed to the 
Seventh Circuit's finding of a sufficient basis for according standing to 
employment testers.89 
Broadly reading the purposes underlying Title VII, however, does 
not mean that the courts must defer to every novel attempt to assert 
standing under the statute. While some members of Congress did state 
the purposes of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and Title VII quite broadly,9() 
at no point did Congress actually consider the import of the statutory 
language defining unlawful employment practices.91 The most direct 
reference to these provisions in the congressional debate came from 
Senator Edmund S. Muskie: "I submit that, read in their entirety, 
these provisions provide a clear and definitive indication of the type of 
practice which this title seeks to eliminate."92 Yet, this most direct ref­
erence is conclusory, providing no substantive explanation of the 
reach of the unlawful employment practices provisions.93 In fact, no 
substantive change was made to the unlawful employment practices 
provisions of Title VII after the Act was reported out of the House 
Judiciary Committee.94 Moreover, the text of the House Judiciary 
Committee's report itself does not speak to the purposes behind or the 
scope of the unlawful employment practices provisions.95 
87. Id. at 297-98. 
88. EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 69, at Section 111.A.2 ("The injury is 
disparate treatment based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, rather than the loss 
of employment or housing."). 
89. Kyles, 222 F.3d at 300. 
90. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
91. See EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 
TITLE VII AND XI OF CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 1005 (1968) [hereinafter EEOC 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY] (noting that, with the exception of the addition of sex as a forbid­
den basis of discrimination, no substantive changes were made to the unlawful employment 
practices provisions during Title VIl's consideration by the full House and Senate). The 
relevant statutory language defining unlawful employment practices has been codified at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)-(d) (1994). 
92. 110 CONG. REC. 12,618 (1964). 
93. See id. 
94. EEOC LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 91, at 1005; see also 110 CONG. REC. 
12,721, 12,722-24, 12,818-20 (1964) (noting that the Dirksen-Mansfield substitute amend­
ment, which eventually was passed as Title VII, made no change to the unlawful employ­
ment practices sections); id. at 12,812 (illustrating that the annotated version of the bill, 
showing the changes between the House and Senate versions of the bill, contains no changes 
to the unlawful employment practices provisions); id. at 12,863-67 (containing the Clarke­
Case substitute amendment, which, though not adopted, also made no attempt to alter the 
unlawful employment practices provisions). 
95. See generally H.R. REP. NO. 88-914 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391. 
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Most of the references to the purposes of the employment provi­
sions by congressional committees during this period came during the 
House Education and Labor Committee's consideration of the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Act, the provisions of which were largely 
incorporated into or influenced the provisions of Title VII.96 In its re­
port, the Labor and Education Committee focused on the positive 
economic benefits that would inure to members of minority groups if 
they were able to secure employment on a footing equal with whites.97 
The Committee also called attention to the positive economic benefits 
that would flow to the nation if employment opportunities could be 
equalized, focusing specifically on lessening the need for welfare assis­
tance among minorities and enhancing labor utilization in an increas­
ingly competitive global economic environment.98 These concrete 
goals focus upon the benefits that stem from employment itself. An 
employment tester does not suffer any injury to her employment 
prospects; in fact, performing the testing itself fulfills her employment 
objectives.99 Congress cannot be said to have foreseen or to have had 
in mind in crafting Title VII the types of injuries, wholly unrelated to 
an individual's own employment opportunities, that could be suffered 
by employment testers. 
B. Redressability and Prospective Relief 
Employment testers also cannot satisfy the requirements for the 
redressability prong100 of the Article III standing inquiry. In order to 
meet the redressability requirement for prospective relief,101a plaintiff 
must show a real and immediate threat of injury.102 Redressability, in 
the context of prospective relief, requires this threat of continuing in­
jury because the prospective relief can only redress the plaintiff's in­
jury if she is among those receiving benefits of that relief.103 Employ­
ment testers, however, cannot meet this requirement, as they, by 
96. EEOC LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 91, at 2155. 
97. H.R. REP. No. 87-1370, at 2-3 (1962). 
98. Id. 
99. See supra notes 44-48, 67-68 and accompanying text. 
100. See supra note 29. 
101. See supra note 20; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g){l) {1994) (including injunction, 
reinstatement, hiring, backpay, or "any other equitable relief as the court deems appropri­
ate" as forms of prospective relief for intentional discrimination under Title VII); id. at 
2000e-5(g){2) (including declaratory or injunctive relief but denying reinstatement, hiring, 
promotion, or backpay as equitable relief in mixed motive cases under Title VII). 
102. Lyons v. City of Los Angeles, 461 U.S. 95, 105-06 (1983). 
103. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 766 (1984) (" 'The necessity that the plaintiff who 
seeks to invoke judicial power stand to profit in some personal interest remains an Art. III 
requirement.'" (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 39 (1976)). 
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definition, will not be among the class of persons who would benefit 
from prospective relief granted against a particular employer.104 In 
Fair Employment Council of Greater Washington, Inc., v. BMC 
Marketing Corp.,105 the D.C. Circuit, following the Supreme Court's 
analysis in Lyons v. City of Los Angeles,106 held that employment test­
ers lacked standing to pursue prospective relief.107 While tester plain­
tiffs may assert that the emotional harms caused by the defendant's 
alleged discriminatory actions cause continuing harm, the D.C. Circuit 
noted that, under Lyons, the continuing effects of a prior injury, ab­
sent a likelihood of a future separate injury, are insufficient to estab­
lish standing for prospective relief.108 Employment testers cannot meet 
this burden as their lack of interest in either present or future em­
ployment with the defendant erases the possibility of them receiving 
any personal benefit from the issuance of prospective relief.109 
Proponents of standing for testers argue that denying prospective 
relief undermines the strength of Title VII by eliminating a key 
weapon for the eradication of workplace discrimination.110 Daniel M. 
Tardiff argues that "adherence to the Lyons standard amounts to 
'arch-formalism' and is completely inconsistent with the broad stand­
ing given by Title VII and accorded by the courts in civil rights 
cases."111 In addition to agreeing with Tardiff that applying the Lyons 
standard would undermine congressional intent, the EEOC argues 
that the text of Title VII "permits a court to award an injunction based 
on past discrimination without requiring the plaintiff to make a sepa-
104. Fair Employment Council of Greater Wash., Inc., v. BMC Mktg. Corp., 28 F.3d 
1268, 1275 (D.C. Cir. 1994); see also Allen, 468 U.S. at 766. 
105. 28 F.3d 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
106. 461 U.S. 95 (1983). While at least one district court held that the Lyons analysis 
applies only where the plaintiff seeks prospective relief against a governmental actor, 
Natural Res. Def. Council v. Southwest Marine, Inc., 39 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1240-41 (S.D. Cal. 
1999), several circuit courts have applied the Lyons rubric in suits against private defen­
dants. Bowen v. First Family Fin. Servs., 233 F.3d 1331, 1340 (11th Cir. 2000); Armstrong v. 
Turner Indus., 141 F.3d 554, 562-63 (5th Cir. 1 998); lmagineering, Inc. v. Kiewit Pacific Co., 
976 F.2d 1 303, 1 308-09 (9th Cir. 1992). 
107. BMC Mktg. Corp., 28 F.3d at 1272-75. 
108. Id. at 1273 (quoting Lyons, 461 U.S. at 107 n.8). 
109. Yelnosky, supra note 7, at 437 (while arguing for the positive effects of employ­
ment testing program, admitting that testers "do not meet the 'personal benefits' require­
ment for injunctive relief'). 
110. See, e.g., EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 69, at Section Ill.A.3 
("[T]o deny injunctive relief to individuals who prove that they were victims of a pattern of 
discrimination undermines congressional intent to deter discrimination by permitting indi­
viduals to function as private attorneys general."); Tardiff, supra note 6, at 957-58 
("[D]enying testers standing for equitable relief will leave less incentive for employers to 
comply with Title VII."). 
111. Tardiff, supra note 6, at 958. 
October 2002] Employment Tester Standing 251 
rate showing of likely future harm."m The EEOC notes that Title VII 
permits a court to "impose injunctive relief whenever 'the [defendant] 
has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful 
employment practice,' " allowing prospective relief even for past dis­
criminatory acts.113 
These arguments fail to reach the crux of the issue. First, the statu­
tory language of Title VII relied upon by the EEOC to justify injunc­
tive relief against past discrimination requires that the defendant have 
engaged in an "unlawful employment practice."114 Discrimination 
against an employment tester, while objectionable, is not an "unlawful 
employment practice" under the Act, as Title VII only provides pro­
tection to those desiring actual employment opportunities, which a 
tester admittedly does not.115 Thus, prospective relief would not be 
available under the statute to enjoin this behavior. Second, even if the 
statute intends to permit the courts to extend such prospective relief, 
the statute itself cannot confer upon the courts the power to issue such 
relief. 116 Congress lacks the power to abrogate the Article III standing 
requirements.117 Even if Congress intended the result proffered by the 
EEOC, the standing requirements of Article III still require that a 
prospective plaintiff show that the requested relief will redress his in­
jury.1'8 While employment testers may be able to assert emotional 
harm stemming from discriminatory treatment, their lack of interest in 
pursuing employment opportunities with the defendant prevents any 
assertion that the defendant's conduct presents a sufficient likelihood 
of future harm to the plaintiff.119 
C. EEOC's Enforcement Guidance and Judicial Deference 
In 1996, the EEOC reaffirmed an earlier enforcement guidance, 
finding that employment testers possess standing under Title VIl.120 As 
the administrative agency vested with primary authority to pursue the 
goals of Title VII, 121 the EEOC's interpretation of Title VII should ar-
112. EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 69, at Section 111.A.3 (citing 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1994)). 
113. Id. 
114. 42 u.s.c. § 2000e-5(g). 
115. See supra notes 44-48, 67-68 and accompanying text. 
116. Doe v. Nat'l Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 199 F.3d 146, 153 (3d Cir. 1999). 
117. Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979). 
118. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). 
119. Fair Employment Council of Greater Wash., Inc., v. BMC Mktg. Corp., 28 F.3d 
1268, 1275 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
120. EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 69, at Section I. 
121. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1994). 
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guably be granted respect by the courts.122 The Supreme Court has 
held that, because the EEOC lacks rule-making authority, EEOC en­
forcement guidances are not entitled to deference123 under Chevron, 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council.124 Nevertheless, the 
Court has also found that pronouncements like the enforcement 
guidances issued by the EEOC may still be accorded respect.125 Re­
cently, in United States v. Mead Corp. ,126 the Supreme Court reaf­
firmed its holding in Skidmore v. Swift & Co. ,127 defining the level of 
deference properly accorded to statutory constructions of administra­
tive agencies that lack the force of law: "The fair measure of deference 
to an agency administering its own statute has been understood to 
vary with circumstances, and courts have looked to the degree of the 
agency's care, its consistency, formality, and relative expertness, and 
to the persuasiveness of the agency's position."128 The Court has also 
recognized that whether an administrative interpretation is issued con­
temporaneously with the legislative act in question bears upon the re­
liability of that interpretation in reflecting congressional intent and 
thus also upon the proper weight to be accorded the agency's pro­
nouncement.129 
122. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 642 (1998) ("[T)he well-reasoned views of the 
agencies implementing a statute 'constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to 
which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.' " (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & 
Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-140 (1944)); see also United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 235 
(2001) (reaffirming continuing validity of Skidmore deference analysis). 
123. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 256-58 (1991); Gen. Elec. Co. v. 
Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141 (1976) ("[C]ourts properly may accord less weight to [EEOC] 
guidelines than to administrative regulations which Congress has declared shall have the 
force of law . . .  .''); see also Anderson, supra note 53, at 1266 (though arguing for validity of 
EEOC Enforcement Guidance, admitting that the guidance "certainly does not possess the 
force of law"); cf. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) ("Interpretations 
such as those in opinion letters - like interpretations contained in policy statements, agency 
manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the force of law - do not warrant 
Chevron-style deference.''). 
124. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
125. Mead, 533 U.S. at 276-77. 
126. 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
127. 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
128. Mead, 533 U.S. at 228 (citing Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 139-40). 
129. Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965) (determining that administrative interpreta­
tions deserve respect "[p)articularly . . .  when the administrative practice at stake involves a 
contemporaneous construction of a statute by" the agency charged with its enforcement) 
(quoting Power Reactor Dev. Co. v. lnt'I Union of Electricians, 367 U.S. 396, 408 (1961)); 
accord United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 200, 216 n.13 (2001); Davis 
v. United States, 495 U.S. 472, 484 (1990); Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 
491 U.S. 440, 463 n.12 (1989); Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 476 U.S. 
426, 438 (1986); Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 272-73 (1981); see also EEOC v. Arabian Am. 
Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 257 (1991) (applying the contemporaneous criterion in determining 
the level of respect to accord EEOC guidelines); Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers' Int'I 
Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 465 & n.38 (1986) (same); EEOC v. Assoc. Dry Goods Corp., 
449 U.S. 590, 600 n.17 (1981) (same). 
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Admittedly, the EEOC carefully and formally creates its policy 
guidances and exercises primary executive authority in the field of 
employment discrimination.130 The Commission, however, did not as­
sert its position that Title VII accords standing to employment testers 
contemporaneously with the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.131 
The EEOC's original 1990 enforcement guidance trailed passage of 
the Act by twenty-six years - by seventeen years more than the 
EEOC guidance that the Supreme Court declined to follow in General 
Electric Company v. Gilbert.132 The EEOC's interpretation deserves 
some respect based upon its consistency, careful formulation and the 
agency's status as the primary enforcer of employment rights laws. 
Nevertheless, given the non-contemporaneous nature of the interpre­
tation and the EEOC's lack of rule-making authority, the level of re­
spect accorded the EEOC's policy guidance should turn upon the per­
suasiveness of its position133 - an issue founded upon the proper 
reading of the statutory language of and the congressional intent be­
hind Title VII.134 The statutory language and legislative history of Title 
130. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1994). 
131. EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 69, at Section I (noting that original 
policy guidance on employment testers was promulgated in 1990); see also supra note 129 
and accompanying text. 
132. Compare EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 69, at Section I (noting 
that the latest policy guidance builds upon the original guidance, produced in 1990), with 
Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 142 (1976) ("The EEOC guideline in question does 
not fare well under these standards. It is not a contemporaneous interpretation of Title VII, 
since it was first promulgated eight years after the enactment of that Title."). 
133. The courts have yet to articulate a consistent method for analyzing persuasiveness 
under Mead. Compare Heartland By-Products v. United States, 264 F.3d 1126, 1135 (Fed. 
Cir. 2001), with James v. Zemenszky, 284 F.3d 1310, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2002). In Heartland By­
Product, the Federal Circuit, for example, held that the power of an agency to persuade de­
pends on "its logic and expertness . . .  the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the va­
lidity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those 
factors that give it power to persuade." 264 F.3d at 1135 (internal quotations and citations 
omitted); accord Mead Corp. v. United States, 283 F.3d 1342, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2002). This ap­
proach, though, reinserts two other Mead factors - consistency and expertness - into the 
persuasiveness analysis. See Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at228. The same circuit in James, on the 
other hand, independently analyzed the persuasiveness of an agency's position under Mead 
by considering the position in light of the statutory text and legislative history in question. 
284 F.3d at 1319 (citing Mead Corp., 121 S. Ct. at 2176); see also U.S. Freightways Corp. v. 
Comm'r of the Internal Revenue Serv., 270 F.3d 1137, 1145 (7th Cir. 2001) (treating "per­
suasiveness" as a separate inquiry under Mead). This Note maintains that the James ap­
proach to the persuasiveness analysis should govern, as it treats the persuasiveness prong as 
an independent variable rather than double counting criteria to increase the apparent per­
suasiveness of an agency position. Cf. Sec. Indus. Ass'n v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve 
Sys., 468 U.S. 137, 143 (1984): 
Judicial deference to an agency's interpretation of a statute only sets the framework for judi­
cial analysis; it does not displace it. A reviewing court must reject administrative construc­
tions of [a] statute, whether reached by adjudication or by rulemaking, that are inconsistent 
with the statutory mandate or that frustrate the policy that Congress sought to implement. 
(internal citations and quotations omitted). 
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VII, however, undermine the persuasiveness of the EEOC's position 
on standing for employment testers.135 
· 
II. EMPLOYMENT TESTER STANDING UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1981 
This Part argues that employment testers cannot meet the standing 
requirements necessary to pursue claims for damages under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1981. Section II.A notes that, unlike under Title VII, employment 
testers pressing § 1981 claims must overcome prudential standing re­
quirements. Section 11.B makes the case that employment testers fall 
outside the zone of interests sought to be protected by the statute in 
question. Section 11.C maintains that public policy arguments prof­
fered by supporters of tester standing under § 1981 are insufficient to 
overcome the requirements of the standing doctrine. 
A. Applicability of Prudential Standing Requirements 
The traditional standing analysis includes both constitutionally 
based Article III requirements as well as judicially created prudential 
standing requirements.136 Whereas plaintiffs pursuing Title VII claims 
need only satisfy the Article III requirements, due to congressional 
waiver of the prudential concerns,137 no such waiver has been found 
with respect to § 1981.138 Under Title VII, congressional intent to 
waive prudential standing requirements could be found in the statute's 
broad definition of the claimant class - "person claiming to be ag­
grieved. "139 Indeed, " [h]istory associates the word 'aggrieved' with a 
134. James, 284 F.3d at 1319, (determining that agency position "is unpersuasive be­
cause [the agency] . . .  has not pointed to any statutory basis for [its] finding"); Student Loan 
Fund of Idaho, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Educ., 272 F.3d 1155, 1167 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(considering congressional intent in determining persuasiveness of Secretary's position un­
der Mead); see also Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000). 
135. See supra notes 44-48, 58-68, 90-98 and accompanying text (determining that the 
statutory text and legislative history of Title VII do not evince a desire on the part of Con­
gress to accord standing to employment testers); cf. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 
434 (1971) ("Since the Act aml its legislative history support the . . .  [EEOC's] construction, 
this affords good reason to treat the guidelines as expressing the will of Congress." (empha­
sis added)). 
136. See supra notes 18-19. 
137. Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Sec. Servs., 222 F.3d 289, 295 (7th Cir. 2000); accord EEOC 
v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477, 482 (5th Cir. 1980). 
138. Kyles, 222 F.3d at 303. 
139. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1994); Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 
(1972) (finding that such language present in both Title VIII and Title VII indicates congres­
sional intent to extend standing to Article Ill limits); see also Dept. of Commerce v. United 
States House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 328-29 (1999): 
Congress has eliminated any prudential co!lcerns in this case by providing that "[a]ny person 
aggrieved by the use of any statistical method in violation of the Constitution or any provi­
sion of law (other than this Act), in connection with the 2000 census or any later decennial 
census, to determine the population for purposes of the apportionment or redistricting of 
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congressional intent to cast the standing net broadly - beyond the 
common law interests and substantive statutory rights upon which 
'prudential' standing traditionally rested."140 Section 1981, though, 
does not contain the "aggrieved" language previously relied upon by 
the Court to find congressional waiver of prudential standing require­
ments.141 
Arguably, the language of § 1981, which extends its statutory pro­
tection to "any person,"142 could be interpreted to encompass an even 
broader class of claimants than would be included in the traditional 
"aggrieved" language. In Bennett v. Spear,143 the Court expanded its 
view of standing where Congress used the term "any person" to define 
the permissible plaintiff class under the Endangered Species Act. 144 
This instance, however, can readily be distinguished from the § 1981 
context. The Bennett Court itself noted that its view rested not upon 
the inclusion of the term "any person" in the statute but rather upon 
the fact that the legislation's subject matter, the legislation's purpose 
to promote enforcement by private attorneys general, and the partici­
pation of the government in the statutory enforcement scheme fa­
vored an expansive view of standing. 145 While one might rightly argue 
that civil rights statutes deserve as great a deference to judicial inter­
pretation of their reach as environmental statutes, § 1981 does not in­
clude any indicia that the rights granted by its text are meant to be en­
forced by litigants acting in the role of "private attorneys general."146 
The role of private attorneys general has most often been recognized 
Members in Congress, may in a civil action obtain declaratory, injunctive, and any other ap­
propriate relief against the use of such method." (emphasis added). 
140. FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 19 (1998) (citations omitted); see also Dept. of 
Commerce, 525 U.S. at 328-29 (extending standing to Article III limits by virtue of congres­
sional inclusion of term "aggrieved" in defining to whom the act extended); Gen. Instrument 
Corp. of Del. v. Nu-Tek Elecs. & Mfg., Inc., 197 F.3d 83, 89 (3d Cir. 1999) (same); Ass'n of 
Cmty. Orgs. for Reform Now v. Fowler, 178 F.3d 350, 363 (5th Cir. 1999) (same). 
141. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (1994). 
142. Id. 
143. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997). 
144. Id. at 165. 
145. Id. ; see also Procter & Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., 242 F.3d 539, 561 (5th Cir. 
2001) (declining to find negation of prudential standing requirements under the Lanham 
Act, even though the Act accorded to "any person" the right to bring suit); Conte Bros. 
Auto., Inc. v. Quaker State-Slick 50, Inc., 165 F.3d 221, 227 (3d Cir. 1998) (same). 
146. See Hannah L. Buxbaum, The Private Attorney General in a Global Age: Public 
Interests in Private International Antitrust Litigation, 26 YALE J. lNT'L LAW 219, 222-23 
(2001) (noting that the role of private attorneys general is to enhance the government's own 
enforcement mechanisms); see also Robert A. Anthony, Zone-Free Standing for Private 
Attorneys General, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 237, 237 n.l (1999) (outlining role of private 
attorneys general in seeking judicial review of agency action or aiding the enforcement of 
statutory programs). 
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either where the harm in controversy is diffuse147 or where the actual 
injured party cannot vindicate its own rights. 148 The harm envisioned 
by § 1981, on the other hand, is specific; here, Congress created a legal 
framework to protect individuals in their specific contractual dealings 
with others.149 Moreover, the role of private attorneys general is to en­
hance the enforcement activities of governmental agencies.1so Section 
1981, unlike the Endangered Species Act or Title VII, does not pro­
vide for government enforcement or involvement in litigation.1s1 As a 
whole, § 1981 lacks the factors that motivated the Court in Bennett to 
negate its prudential standing requirements.152 
Some have argued that important public policies underlying the 
passage of § 1981 support lessening the standing hurdles for claimants 
under this section. 153 The Third Circuit, determining that Congress had 
waived the prudential standing requirements with respect to § 1981, 
found that a strict reading of the requirements of the prudential 
standing doctrine would frustrate the public policy goals reflected in 
both Title VII and § 1981.154 During consideration of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, Congress even noted that Title VII and § 1981 should be 
treated as "co-extensive."15s Nevertheless, attributing an intent to 
waive § 198l's prudential standing requirements to this congressional 
statement would violate traditional canons of statutory construction in 
the standing area, which require Congress to "express[ly] negate" 
these standing requirements.156 Moreover, congressional intent to 
147. Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 208 (1972) (recognizing role of 
private attorneys general in pursuing claims for injury due to loss of "the social benefits of 
living in an integrated community"). 
148. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'! Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 16-17 
(1981) (noting role of private attorneys general in enforcing ESA to protect endangered spe­
cies). 
149. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (1994). 
150. Buxbaum, supra note 146, at 223. 
151. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1994) (describing role of EEOC in Title VII en­
forcement), and 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(2)(A)-(B) (1994) (describing [role] of government in 
ESA enforcement), with 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (failing to note any role for the government in en­
forcing § 1981 ). 
152. See supra notes 145-151 and accompanying text. 
153. Hackett v. McGuire Bros., Inc., 445 F.2d 442, 446-47 (3d Cir. 1971); Landever, 
supra note 13, at 394. 
154. Hackett, 445 F.2d at 446-47. 
155. See Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 459 (1975). Bllt see Fair 
Employment Council of Greater Wash., Inc., v. BMC Mktg. Corp., 28 F.3d 1268, 1278 (D.C. 
Cir. 1994) (citing Johnson, 421 U.S. at 459) (determining that the "co-extensive" language 
used by Congress "simply mean[s] lhat the two statutes co-exist[ ], with the result that Title 
VII . . .  [does) not pre-empt whatever rights an individual might enjoy under§ 1981.") (em­
phasis omitted). 
156. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 164 (1997); see also supra note 139 and accompa­
nying text (describing language that meets express negation requirement). 
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waive prudential standing requirements must be part of the contempo­
raneous adoption of or subsequent amendment to a statute.157 The 
congressional statement at issue here, though, occurred during consid­
eration of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, almost a century after the pas­
sage of the Civil Rights Acts of 1866.158 Any relevant congressional 
belief in the effects of § 1981 statutory language upon the prudential 
standing requirements would have required either an expression by 
the Thirty-Ninth Congress of its intent or an amendment to the statute 
by a subsequent congress.159 While congressional intent behind pas­
sage of the provisions of § 1981 aimed broadly at discrimination, the 
necessary evidence of congressional desire to waive prudential stand­
ing requirements remains lacking.160 
B. Statutory Zone of Interests 
The Judiciary's self-imposed prudential standing requirements 
prevent plaintiffs from asserting the rights of third parties, litigating 
generalized grievances common to either all citizens or a broad class 
of citizens, or seeking judicial intervention in an area outside the zone 
of interests "arguably . . .  protected or regulated by the statute or con­
stitutional guarantee in question."161 Employment tester plaintiffs 
157. United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960) ("[T]he views of a subsequent 
Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one."); accord 
Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 117-18 (1980); 
Waterman Steamship Corp. v. United States, 381 U.S. 252, 269 (1965); see also United States 
v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 282 (1947). 
158. BMC Mktg. Corp., 28 F.3d at 1278. 
159. See Price, 361 U.S. at 313. 
160. Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Sec. Servs., 222 F.3d 289, 303 (7th Cir. 2000). 
161. Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970); see also 
Valley Forge Christian College v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 
464, 475 (1982); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. 
to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 220 (1974); supra note 18 (describing the prudential standing 
requirements). Some commentators continue to argue that the zone of interests test is one of 
limited application. TRIBE, supra note 30, at 434, 446. A proper determination of the correct 
application of the zone of interests test suffers from the Court's own muddled jurisprudence 
on the purpose of the zone of interests prong. Compare Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 
388, 400 n.16 (1987) ("The principle cases in which the 'zone of interest' test has been ap­
plied are those involving claims under the AP A [Administrative Procedure Act], and the test 
is most usefully understood as a gloss on the meaning of§ 702 [of the APA]."), with Valley 
Forge Christian College, 454 U.S. at 475 (including zone of interests among the prudential 
concerns to be considered by the Court in reviewing the Establishment Clause case before 
it). The Court, however, has now resolved this issue in favor of including zone of interests 
"among [its] other prudential standing requirements of general application." Bennett v. 
Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 163 (1997) (emphasis added). In fact, in the years following the Bennett 
decision, the circuit courts of appeals have applied the zone of interests test in a wide variety 
of statutory and constitutional contexts. See Tennessee Valley Auth. v. EPA, 278 F.3d 1184, 
1207-08 (11th Cir. 2002) (Clean Air Act); Oxford Assocs. v. Waste System Auth., 271 F.3d 
140, 146-47 (3d Cir. 2001) (Commerce Clause); Casumpang v. lnt'I Longshoreman's and 
Warehouseman's Union, Local 142, 269 F.3d 1042, 1055-56 (9th Cir. 2001) (Labor­
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act); Pharm. Research and Mfrs. of Am. v. 
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clearly do not seek solely to assert the rights of third parties; in their 
chosen role as testers, these individuals suffer individual, emotional 
harm due to discriminatory treatment.162 In addition, while testers 
share an interest in attacking discrimination with the citizenry as a 
whole, this common interest does not undermine the tester's claim of 
individualized harm.163 Nonetheless, the employment tester plaintiff 
does not fully satisfy the prudential requirements, as her injury does 
not come within the statutory zone of interests created by § 1981. 
1. Statutory Text 
While the zone of interests test does not require that Congress ex­
press a specific intent to benefit the particular plaintiff before the 
court, in order for her case arguably to come within § 1981 's zone of 
interests, an employment tester must demonstrate that either the 
statutory language itself or congressional intent aimed to include test­
ers within the class of claimants able to bring suit under the statute.164 
The language of § 1981 provides for the recognition of every citizen's 
right "to make and enforce contracts" to the same extent "as is en­
joyed by white citizens."165 Subsection (b) defines "make and enforce 
contracts" to include "the making, performance, modification, and 
termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, 
terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship."166 On its face, 
Concannon, 249 F.3d 66, 73 (1st Cir. 2001) (Supremacy Clause); On the Green Apartments 
LLC v. City of Tacoma, 241 F.3d 1235, 1239 (9th Cir. 2001) (Dormant Commerce Clause); 
San Xavier Dev. Auth. v. Charles, 237 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2001) (General Allotment 
Act); In re Vitamins Antitrust Class Actions, 215 F.3d 26, 29 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure); Sac and Fox Nation of Mo. v. Pierce, 213 F.3d 566, 575 (10th Cir. 2000) 
(Indian Commerce Clause); Weber v. Cranston Sch. Comm., 212 F.3d 41, 51 (1st Cir. 2000) 
(Individuals with Disabilities Education Act). 
162. Kyles, 222 F.3d at 300; see also EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 69, 
at Section III.A.2. 
163. Landever, supra note 13, at 387; see also Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 
(1972) ("[T]he fact that particular environmental interests are shared by the many rather 
than the few does not make them less deserving of legal protection through the judicial pro­
cess."). 
164. See Air Courier Conference of Am. v. Am. Postal Workers Union AFL-CIO, 498 
U.S. 517, 524-26 (1991); see also Weber, 212 F.3d at 51 ("As noted, we review the language 
and structure of . . .  [the statute] to determine whether [plaintiffs] retaliation claim falls 
within the zone of interests protected by [the statute)."). 
165. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (1994). 
166. 42 U.S.C. § 198l(b) (1994). Section 198l(b) was added by Congress in 1991 in re­
sponse to the Supreme Court's decision in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 
(1989). In Patterson, the Court held that "harassment relating to the conditions of employ­
ment is not actionable under§ 1981 because that provision does not apply to conduct which 
occurs after the formation of a contract and which does not interfere with the right to en­
force established contract obligations." Id. at 171. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 added sub­
section b to§ 1981 in order to make clear Congress's intent to protect contracting parties, 
especially employees, even after contract formation. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 
102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (1994)); see also Mass v. 
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the purpose of the statute is to protect those individuals who seek to 
enter into a contractual relationship.167 Thus, in analyzing whether 
testers come under the statutory umbrella of § 1981, one must focus 
attention upon whether a tester who faced discriminatory treatment 
has arguably been denied the right to make or enforce a contract. 
No one would suggest that a tester, who does not even seek to 
form an employment relationship with the employer in question, could 
suffer any injury based on the performance, modification, or termina­
tion elements of the statute or from a limitation of her ability to enjoy 
a continuing contractual relationship. Moreover, testers do not desire 
to make or enforce contracts;168 " [a]t most . . .  [employers] deprive[ ] 
the tester plaintiffs of the opportunity to refuse to enter into an em­
ployment contract."169 In fact, the contractual relationship sought by 
the tester, based upon misrepresentations not only of her desire for 
employment but also of her qualifications for the job, is voidable by 
the employer.17° Section 1981 protects the contractual rights of non­
white citizens to the same extent as those rights might be "enjoyed by 
white citizens."171 The basic premises of contract law, however, make 
clear that no one who materially misrepresents herself in contract ne-
Martin Marietta Corp., 805 F. Supp. 1530, 1534 (D. Colo. 1992) (noting that the Act "ex­
pands the scope of section 1981 . . .  overturning the limitations judicially imposed on section 
1981 by [Patterson)"). Interestingly, in passing the Act, Congress expanded the scope of 
"make and enforce contracts" under § 1981 only to provide greater protection for individu­
als after the formation of a contractual relationship. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b). The Act, in fact, 
made no mention of a congressional desire to expand the definition of "making" contracts to 
give greater protection to individuals like testers. See generally Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. 
L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071. 
167. Morris v. Office Max, Inc., 89 F.3d 411, 414-15 (7th Cir. 19%) ("A claim for inter­
ference with the right to make and enforce a contract must allege the actual loss of a con­
tract interest, not merely the possible loss of future contract opportunities."). 
168. See Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Sec. Servs., 222 F.3d 289, 302 (7th Cir. 2000); cf Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 n.l (1992) (confirming that standing must be con­
sidered from the perspective of the plaintiff by noting that "the injury must affect the plain­
tiff in a personal and individual way"). 
169. Fair Employment Council of Greater Wash., Inc., v. BMC Mktg. Corp., 28 F.3d 
1268, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
170. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164(1) (1978) ("If a party's manifesta­
tion of assent is induced by either a fraudulent or a material misrepresentation by the other 
party upon which the recipient is justified in relying, the contract is voidable by the recipi­
ent."); see also Addisu v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 198 F.3d 1130, 1140 (9th Cir. 2000) ("Appellants 
attempted to obtain the seller's consent to sale by a fraudulent and material misrepresenta­
tion. The loss of an opportunity to enter into such a voidable contract is not an injury cogni­
zable under § 1981."); BMC Mktg. Corp., 28 F.3d at 1271 ("Any resulting contracts between 
the tester plaintiffs and BMC [the defendant] would have been voidable at BMC's option . . .  
Even on plaintiffs' argument, then, BMC did not deny the testers the opportunity to enter 
into a contract that they could have enforced."); cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 162(1)(a) ("A misrepresentation is fraudulent if the maker intends his asser­
tion to induce a party to manifest his assent and the maker (a) knows or believes that the 
assertion is not in accord with the facts . . . .  "). 
171. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). 
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gotiations develops a legally protected contract interest in the fonna­
tion of a voidable contract.172 In fact, a legally protected interest in the 
formation of a voidable contract inures only to the object of the mis­
representations - in this case, the employer - not to the party mak­
ing the misrepresentations, the tester.173 
While, from the perspective of a discriminating employer, the 
tester has been denied the opportunity to make an employment con­
tract, standing doctrine neither is an objective test nor does it turn on 
the subjective perceptions of a party other than the plaintiff.174 Courts 
analyze both the prudential and Article III standing requirements 
from the perspective of the plaintiff, in this case, the tester.175 In the 
tester's case, the employer has only denied her the opportunity to en­
ter into a voidable contract, a contract interest to which she has no le­
gal right and for which she can obtain no legal protection.176 Absent 
actual formation of, or intent to fonn, a legally protected contractual 
interest177 on the part of the tester, any injury suffered by the employ­
me·nt tester lies outside the zone of interests protected by § 1981.178 
172. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164(1); cf Kawitt v. United States, 
842 F.2d 951, 953 (7th Cir. 1988) ("[A] job obtained by an admitted and material misrepre­
sentation is not a property right upon which a constitutional suit can be founded."). 
173. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164(1); see also BMC Mktg. Corp., 
28 F.3d at 1271 ("In any event, the rule that contracts obtained through misrepresentations 
are merely voidable rather than void seems designed entirely to protect the target of the mis­
representations.") (emphasis in original). 
174. TRIBE, supra note 30, § 3-14, at 385 (citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968) 
("Standing differs, in theory, from all other elements of justiciability by focusing primarily 
'on the party seeking to get his complaint before a federal court' . . . .  "). 
175. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819 (1997) ("We have consistently stressed that a 
plaintiffs complaint must establish that he has a 'personal stake' in the alleged dispute, and 
that the alleged injury suffered is particularized as to him."); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 
504 U.S. 555, 560 & n.1 (1992) (noting that the standing inquiry focuses upon injury done to 
the plaintiff and whether the plaintiff will be benefited by redress); Air Courier Conference 
of Am. v. Am. Postal Workers Union AFL-CIO, 498 U.S. 517, 524-26 (1991) (noting that the 
zone of interests inquiry focuses upon whether Congress intended to include a person in the 
position of the plaintiff among the class able to bring suit); Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 
479 U.S. 388, 399-400 (1987) (same). 
176. See supra notes 168-173 and accompanying text. 
177. Morris v. Office Max, Inc., 89 F.3d 411, 414 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that § 1981 pro­
tects against "the actual loss of a contract interest"); see also id. (declining to recognize the 
"general interest in . . .  [the] merchandise" plead by the plaintiffs as a cognizable interest 
under § 1981). 
178. Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Sec. Servs., 222 F.3d at 289, 304 (7th Cir. 2000); accord 
BMC Mktg. Corp., 28 F.3d at 1271; see also Mackey v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 724 F.2d 419, 421 
(4th Cir. 1984) (finding that housing testers did not have standing to sue under §§ 1981 and 
1982); Davis v. The Mansards, 597 F. Supp. 334, 342, 347 (N.D. Ind. 1984) (finding that only 
couple who actually sought apartment, and not testers, could recover under § 1982 for dis­
criminatory treatment). Contra Open Housing Ctr. v. Samson Mgt. Corp., 152 F.R.D. 472, 
476 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Landever, supra note 13, at 386 ("[W]here a tester is denied his 
right to the initial formation of a contract, that denial gives rise to an injury sufficient to con­
fer standing under § 1981.") (internal quotation omitted). 
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2. Congressional Intent 
Congressional intent, like the text of § 1981, fails to provide the 
requisite safe haven for employment testers. The Civil Rights Act of 
1866 aimed to destroy the vestiges of slavery that continued to mani­
fest themselves in relations between blacks and whites following the 
Civil War179 and, more specifically, to counteract provisions of the 
Black Codes.180 The Codes forced blacks to enter into long-term em­
ployment contracts, mandated harsh criminal sanctions for violators of 
the labor provisions of the Codes, and apprenticed young blacks to 
their former masters.181 Congress aimed broadly in passing the Act to 
counteract the Codes and included the employment context within the 
purview of the contracts clause of the Act. Nonetheless, the general 
aims of the Act fail to indicate that Congress intended to include pro­
tection for the misrepresenting party in the voidable contract context, 
the tester in this case.182 
A reading of the debates over the Civil Rights Act of 1866 reveals 
only three discussions regarding the nature of the contracts provision 
of the statute.183 Although these instances illustrate that Congress con-
179. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866) (statement of Sen. Trumbull, spon­
sor of the legislation). 
180. In the period between the end of the Civil War and the initiation of congressional 
Reconstruction, most of the states of the former Confederacy passed harsh criminal and civil 
provisions restricting the rights of newly freed slaves. ROBERT CRUDEN, THE NEGRO IN 
RECONSTRUCTION 27 {1969). These laws are collectively referred to as the Black Codes. Id. 
181. In South Carolina, for example, black children, whose parents the courts deemed 
incapable of caring for them, were forcibly apprenticed, usually to their former slave mas­
ters, and all blacks were legally bound to enter into labor contracts. CRUDEN, supra note 
180, at 21. In Mississippi, freedmen were required to enter into employment contracts by the 
second Monday in January of 1866 or face criminal sanctions. VERNON LANE WHARTON, 
THE NEGRO IN MISSISSIPPI 1865-1890 87-88 {1984). The Florida law relating to the employ­
ment of freedmen permitted a black person to be "punished as for vagrancy if, on complaint 
of his master, he were convicted of 'willful disobedience of orders, wanton impudence, or 
disrespect to his employer or his authorized agent, failure to perform his work assigned to 
him, idleness, or abandonment of the premises.' " THEODORE BRANTER WILSON, THE 
BLACK CODES OF THE SOUTH 99 {1965). 
182. See infra notes 183-188 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 168-173 and 
accompanying text. 
183. Given the concern of many senators over miscegenation, the first instance involved 
discussion over the applicability of the contracts language to marriage contracts. CONG. 
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 505-06 {1866); see also Veto Message of President Johnson, 
Civil Rights Act of 1866, April 27, 1866, reprinted in id. at 1680 (discussing the effect of the 
legislation upon the states' ability to enact anti-miscegenation laws). The second exchange 
concerned whether the granting of citizenship to some Native Americans by the bill would 
require states to grant "an Indian the right to contract.'' CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 
572 (1866). The final question raised regarding the contracts clause asked whether the fed­
eral courts could use the Act to create federal contract law or whether the language merely 
permitted the courts to enforce state contract laws equally without regard to race; consider 
the remarks of Senator Cowan: 
Now, a married woman in no State that I know of has a right to make contracts generally. In 
some of the States she cannot contract at all; in others she contracts sub modo; and in all 
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sidered the extent and purpose of the contracts language later codified 
at § 1981, they provide no evidence that Congress intended the con­
tracts language to include protection for the formation of voidable 
contracts.184 The key to understanding congressional intent lies in the 
comparison made clear not only by the terms of the statute but also by 
the language of debate about the bill: " [The bill] simply gives to per­
sons who are of different races or colors the same civil rights."185 While 
the bill was considered "absolutely revolutionary" by many of its sup­
porters,186 Congress did not intend for the Act to grant blacks greater 
protections than those available to whites but rather equal protec­
tions.187 Just as whites cannot found a suit for damages upon a void­
able contract, neither may a non-white employment tester base her ar­
gument for standing upon such a legally unprotected contract 
interest.188 
C. Pro-Standing Policy Arguments: Missing the Mark 
Statutory language and original congressional intent provide no 
shelter for the tester plaintiff. Nevertheless, standing supporters, in­
cluding two circuit courts of appeals,189 argue that two factors favor a 
there is a limit upon her power to contract. Is it intended by this bill that it shall be put in the 
hands of any judge to decide that this bill confers upon married women the unlimited right 
to contract? 
Id. at 1781-82 (statement of Sen. Cowan). In a similar vein, Senator Cowan stated: 
Id. 
I need not remind you, sir, that there are a large number of contracts which are not allowed 
in the several States, some on account of policy, some on account of morality, and others 
upon account of positive injunction to the contrary. A contract in my State made upon the 
Sabbath day is void; but under this bill that contract could be enforced. A contract made 
against chastity, proh pudor, is void; but under this bill that might be enforced. 
184. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 163, 164(1) (1978); cf. Kawitt v. 
United States, 842 F.2d 951, 953 (7th Cir. 1988). 
185. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 504 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard); see 
also 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (1994). 
186. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 570 (1866) (statement of Sen. 
Morrill). 
187. Id. at 1159 (statement of Rep. Windom) ("(The bill) declares that henceforth . . .  
the colored soldier, who has worn the uniform of the Republic and periled his life for its de­
fense, shall have an equal right, nothing more, with the white rebel yet reeking with the 
blood of our murdered defenders . . .  " (emphasis added)); id. at 1293 (statement of Rep. 
Shellabarger) ("[The Act's) whole effect is not to confer or regulate rights, but to require 
that whatever of these enumerated rights and obligations are imposed by State laws shall be 
for and upon all citizens alike without distinctions based on race or former condition in slav­
ery."). 
188. Addisu v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 198 F.3d 1130, 1140 (9th Cir. 2000); Fair Employment 
Council of Greater Wash., Inc., v. BMC Mktg. Corp., 28 F.3d 1268, 1270-71 (D.C. Cir. 1994); 
cf. supra note 172. 
189. See Watts v. Boyd Properties, 758 F.2d 1482, 1485 (11th Cir. 1985); Meyers v. 
Pennypack Woods Home Ownership Ass'n, 559 F.2d 894, 898 (3d Cir. 1977). 
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broad grant of standing under the Civil Rights Act of 1866: Supreme 
Court decisions upholding standing for testers under § 1983190 and the 
broad import of civil rights legislation. 
The weapon of largest caliber possessed by those who argue in fa­
vor of standing for testers under § 1981 owes its manufacture to two 
Supreme Court decisions, Evers v. Dwyer191 and Pierson v. Ray,192 
which granted standing to testers under § 1983. In Evers, the Court ac­
corded standing to a plaintiff who "boarded this particular bus for the 
purpose of instituting this litigation. "193 Faced with a similar situation, 
the Pierson court found that, although plaintiffs used a whites-only bus 
terminal waiting area for the sole purpose of testing the law in ques­
tion, "their deliberate exercise of that right in a peaceful, orderly, and 
inoffensive manner does not disqualify them from seeking damages 
under § 1983."194 Both the Third and Eleventh Circuits relied heavily 
upon the Court's holdings in these cases in finding that tester plain­
tiffs195 possessed standing under the Civil Rights Act of 1866.196 
These courts, in analyzing the applicability of Evers and Pierson, 
ignored several crucial differences between § 1981 and § 1983. In the 
context of public facilities, the tester, though seeking to test the law in 
question, actually uses the public facility or purchases a ticket with the 
intent to use the public facility in question, thus forming the contrac­
tual relationship envisioned by the statute.197 The rider of the bus, for 
190. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994), passed by the Reconstruction Congress as § 1 of the Ku 
Klux Klan Act of 1871, provides a cause of action to private citizens for the "deprivation of 
any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws" by state actors 
acting under the "color" of state law. 
191. 358 U.S. 202 (1958) (per curiam). 
192. 386 U.S. 547 (1967). 
193. Evers, 358 U.S. at 204. 
194. Pierson, 386 U.S. at 558. 
195. The courts in Meyers and Watts found standing for housing testers under § 1982. 
Watts v. Boyd Properties, 758 F.2d 1482, 1485 (11th Cir. 1985); Meyers v. Pennypack Woods 
Home Ownership Ass'n, 559 F.2d 894, 898 (3d Cir. 1977). While not directly applicable to 
the employment tester context under § 1981, the holdings of these courts do create a circuit 
split with the Seventh and D.C. Circuits, which have held that employment testers do not 
have standing under § 1981. Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Sec. Servs., 222 F.3d 289, 302 (7th Cir. 
2000); Fair Employment Council of Greater Wash., Inc., v. BMC Mktg. Corp., 28 F.3d 1268, 
1271 (D.C. Cir. 1994). This split is created because the Supreme Court has held that sections 
1981 and 1982 should not be "construe[d] . . .  differently when applied." Runyon v. McCrary, 
427 U.S. 160, 171 (1976); accord id. at 187 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 190 (Stevens, J., 
concurring); Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, Inc., 410 U.S. 431, 440 (1973); 
Kyles, 222 F.3d at 301. 
196. Meyers, 559 F.2d at 898 (citing both Evers and Pierson for the proposition that 
"[e]ven assuming arguendo that . . .  [plaintiff's] application to . . .  [defendant] was in fact mo­
tivated solely by his desire to test the legality of . . .  [defendant's] policies, such a purpose is 
sufficient to confer standing"); see also Watts, 758 F.2d at 1485 (following Meyers and noting 
that Meyers relied upon Evers and Pierson for support). 
197. Kyles, 222 F.3d at 304; see also Evers, 358 U.S. at 204 (noting that the bus rider in 
question rode the bus and used the public transport). 
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example, completes the necessary relationship between himself and 
the defendant by purchasing a bus ticket and attempting to ride the 
bus. The public facilities tester intends to make use of the public facil­
ity, even if her purpose is also to test the law at issue.198 On the other 
hand, the employment tester has no intent to form the contractual re­
lationship envisioned by the statute.199 Moreover, the language of 
Pierson, which notes that the testers neither "tricked [n]or goaded the 
officers into arresting them,"200 can be read to exclude employment 
testers, who present false credentials and lie during interviews.201 
Finally, while the Third and Eleventh Circuits looked to the 
Supreme Court's § 1983 jurisprudence without questioning its applica­
bility to §§ 1981 or 1982, history counsels against reading the statutes 
together as parallel provisions. Section 1983 shares neither a common 
source nor a common statutory purpose with §§ 1981 and 1982.202 
Sections 1981 and 1982 derive from the Civil Rights Act of 1866, while 
§ 1983 owes its birth to the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871.203 Sections 1981 
and 1982 aim primarily at private conduct, while § 1983 focuses solely 
on conduct by state actors.204 In addition, Congress passed §§ 1981 and 
1982 pursuant to its Thirteenth Amendment remedial powers,205 while 
it enacted § 1983 under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.206 
Although the Court has previously held that §§ 1981 and 1982 should 
be given like construction as both statues derive their language from 
§ 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866,207 the Court has delivered no such 
198. Kyles, 222 F.3d at 304. 
199. See supra notes 168-173 and accompanying text; see also Kyles, 222 F.3d at 304 
("[T]o put it in Evers' context, [the employment tester] . . .  never set[s] foot on the bus."). 
200. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 558 (1967). 
201. Fair Employment Council of Greater Wash., Inc., v. BMC Mktg. Corp., 28 F.3d 
1268, 1270-71 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ("[T]he [employment] testers here made conscious and mate­
rial misrepresentations of fact by deceiving BMC [the defendant] about their intentions and 
by presenting BMC with fictitious credentials."). 
202. Alice M. Beasley and Gail J. Wright, The Civil Rights Acts Revisited, 357 
PLl/LJTJG. 785, 788 (1988). 
203. Id. 
204. Id. 
205. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 603 (1866) (statement of Sen. Hendricks) 
("[T]he provisions of this bill are admirably calculated to secure to these colored persons 
their rights under the [thirteenth] constitutional amendment."); id. at 474, 503 (statements of 
Sens. Howard and Trumbull, the bill's sponsor) (also noting that the bill intended to give 
effect to the provisions of the Thirteenth Amendment); see also Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer 
Co., 392 U.S. 409, 413 (1968) ("[Section 1982] is a valid exercise of the power of Congress to 
enforce the Thirteenth Amendment."). 
206. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961), overruled on other grounds by Monell v. 
Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
207. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 171 (1976). 
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�diet regarding comparisons between §§ 1981 and 1982 and § 1983.208 
Thus, the contention that the Supreme Court's § 1983 tester jurispru­
dence buttresses the argument for employment tester standing fails, as 
the § 1983 tester cases are inapposite to the employment tester context 
under § 1981. 
Nevertheless, the broad purposes of civil rights legislation sing a si­
ren's song for standing supporters. Some argue that the courts should 
liberally interpret § 1981 in order to effectuate Congress's intent to 
eliminate discriminatory contracting practices.209 In Watts v. Boyd 
Properties,210 the Eleventh Circuit accepted the argument that a broad 
reading of standing doctrine was critical to enforcement of the provi­
sions of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and its goal of "eliminat[ing] 'the 
badges and incidents of slavery.' "21 1  While correctly noting that the 
legislation giving rise to § 1981 aimed to eliminate discrimination in 
broad strokes,212 these arguments do not independently support a 
finding of standing. Rather, they merely beg the question of congres­
sional intent behind the statute, for the proper effect to be given leg­
islation lies not in the mind of the judge or legal commentator but 
must instead be surmised from the intent of the relevant Congress.213 
Congress alone has the power, under § 2 of the Thirteenth 
Amendment, to outlaw the "badges and incidents of slavery" and to 
remedy their effects through appropriate legislation.214 While an over­
broad reading of § 1981 serves the desires of tester standing support­
ers, such a reading was not within the scope of the statute as envi­
sioned by the 39th Congress.215 Of course, "Congress could have 
elected to grant standing to plaintiffs to sue [under § 1981] when they 
were denied . . .  a voidable contract,"216 but it did not. Such an over­
sight can be properly corrected only by congressional action to amend 
§ 1981, not judicial fiat. 
208. See id. at 187 (Powell, J., concurring) ("I consider the posture of §§ 1981 and 1982 
in the jurisprudence of this Court to be quite different from that of § 1983."). 
209. See Watts v. Boyd Properties, 758 F.2d 1482, 1485 (11th Cir. 1985); Landever, supra 
note 13, at 394. 
210. 758 F.2d 1482 (1985). 
211. Id. at 1485. 
212. See supra note 186 and accompanying text. 
213. Cf. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 268 (1993) ("Although we have found 
immunities in § 1983 that do not appear on the face of the statute, '(w]e do not have a license 
to establish immunities from § 1983 actions in the interests of what we judge to be sound 
public policy.' " (internal citations omitted)); see also id. ("[O]ur role is to interpret the in­
tent of Congress in enacting § 1983, not to make a freewheeling policy choice.'' (internal ci­
tations omitted)). 
214. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440 (1968). 
215. See supra notes 183-188 and accompanying text (discussing congressional debate 
surrounding passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866). 
216. Addisu v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 198 F.3d 1130, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000). 
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III. LIMITED ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY AND ST ANDING FOR 
EMPLOYMENT TESTERS 
This Part addresses the policy considerations underlying the 
standing doctrine and argues that the courts should deny standing in 
order to serve these policy interests effectively. Section III.A contends 
that denying standing to employment testers serves the principle of 
separation of powers by recognizing the singular role of Congress in 
creating statutory bases for standing. Section IIl.B notes that the po­
litical process can adequately address concerns over judicial activity in 
the area of civil rights, eliminating the need for activist courts to create 
a basis for tester standing. 
A. Valuing the Separation-of-Powers Principle21 7 
As outlined in Parts I and II, the doctrine of standing encompasses 
two separate but interrelated frameworks for analyzing the right of an 
individual plaintiff to bring suit in federal court: the prudential and the 
constitutional.218 Both the prudential and constitutional components of 
the doctrine of standing are founded in concerns over judicial self­
governance, as both seek to limit the interference of the Judiciary in 
the affairs of the political branches.219 In Allen v. Wright,220 the Court 
gave substance to this concern by emphasizing that the principle of 
separation of powers guides its exposition of the doctrine of stand­
ing.221 Relying on the separation of powers principle, the Court has de­
termined that appropriate use of the standing doctrine can help the 
Judiciary to avoid straying beyond its proper constitutional role and 
217. This Note does not address the myriad constitutional issues surrounding the role of 
the Judiciary and the separation of powers principle. Rather, this Note seeks to place the 
question of standing for employment testers in the context of the current Court's view of the 
standing doctrine as being intimately tied to the principle of separation of powers. See Allen 
v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750, 752 (1984). 
218. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992); see also supra notes 18-19. 
219. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997) ("Like their constitutional counterparts, 
these 'judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction' are 'founded in 
concern about the proper - and properly limited - role of the courts in a democratic soci­
ety.' " (internal citations omitted)); see also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996) ("The 
requirement that an inmate alleging a violation of Bounds must show actual injury derives 
ultimately from the doctrine of standing, a constitutional principle that prevents courts of 
law from undertaking tasks assigned to the political branches."). 
220. 468 U.S. 737 (1984). 
221. Id. at 752. In outlining this new perspective, the Court directly rejected the standing 
philosophy of the Warren Court, which ascribed no importance to the principle of separation 
of powers in the standing context. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 100 (1968) ("The question 
whether a particular person is a proper party to maintain the action does not, by its own 
force, raise separation of powers problems related to improper judicial interference in areas 
committed to other branches of the Federal Government."). 
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into the realm of lawmaking.222 Denying standing to employment test­
ers furthers this judicial goal, by illustrating the Judiciary's recognition 
of the singular role of Congress in creating statutory bases for a plain­
tiff's standing. 
While the Court has generally expounded upon this ideal in the 
context of constitutional cases or cases seeking injunctions to force the 
hand of a government agency,223 the principle of separation of powers 
can also play an important role in guiding the Court's determinations 
regarding statutory bases for standing in suits between private parties. 
Absent a basis in a remnant of the federal common law, a plaintiff 
must establish his claim of standing upon either constitutional or statu­
tory ground. In the constitutional realm, the Court has the preeminent 
role in defining a citizen's right to invoke the power of the Judiciary 
under a particular constitutional provision.224 In cases founded upon 
statutory grounds, on the other hand, Congress exercises plenary 
authority in defining the duties attendant and remedies afforded to 
potential plaintiffs, including the right to invoke the judicial power.225 
222 Allen, 468 U.S. at 750 (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)); see also 
Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 744 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("The dangers 
posed by judicial arrogation of the right to resolve general societal conflicts have been mani­
fest to this Court throughout its history."). 
223. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997) (denying standing to members of 
Congress challenging Line-Item Veto Act); Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 161 (1991) 
(denying standing to death-row inmate who challenged the lack of appellate review of a fel­
low inmate's conviction under the Eighth Amendment); Allen, 468 U.S. at 759-60 (refusing 
to hear case, on standing grounds, that attempted to enjoin the IRS to more stringently 
manage the grant of tax-exempt status to private schools); Valley Forge Christian College v. 
Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982) (denying standing 
to civil liberties organization that challenged on Establishment Clause grounds the transfer 
of government-owned property by a federal agency to a religious university); Schlesinger v. 
Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 221-22 (1974) (declining, based on plain­
tiffs' lack of injury-in-fact, to hear case challenging "reserve" military status of several mem­
bers of Congress under Art. I, § 6, cl. 2). 
224. Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 375 (1983): 
[T]he federal courts have jurisdiction to decide all cases 'aris(ing] under the Constitution, 
laws, or treaties of the United States.' This jurisdictional grant provides not only the author­
ity to decide whether a cause of action is stated by a plaintiffs claim that he has been injured 
by a violation of the Constitution, but also the authority to choose among available judicial 
remedies in order to vindicate constitutional rights. (internal citations omitted). 
See also Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 
388, 391-92 (1971) (recognizing private cause of action for damages against federal agents for 
violations of the Fourth Amendment); cf. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) ("[T]he 
federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution."); Marbury v. 
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the province and duty of the 
judicial department to say what the law is."). 
225. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578, 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(1992). The Court, however, has not permitted Congress to run roughshod over the Article 
lII requirements of standing. Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 
(1979). In fact, where Congress has attempted to afford a judicial remedy to plaintiffs who 
lacked an injury-in-fact, the Court has denied standing on Article III grounds. See, 
e.g. , Raines, 521 U.S. at 818 (denying standing due to lack of constitutionally-required 
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The extension of standing to areas, such as employment testing, where 
Congress has not made clear its intent to create statutory protection, 
constitutes an impermissible legislative act on the part of the 
Judiciary.226 Only by demanding that Congress create a specific right, 
the invasion of which would create standing to sue, can the Court reaf­
firm the proper balance of power between the legislative and judicial 
spheres of the government.227 
The courts have previously declined to exercise their judicial 
power where Congress has not evinced its intent to create a cause of 
action applicable to the plaintiff.228 In declining to recognize the right 
of particular plaintiffs to maintain a cause of action absent the explicit 
intention of Congress to provide either a right or remedy to the plain­
tiff, the courts have noted that only Congress may create a private 
right of action to enforce federal law.229 Admittedly, " [s]tanding is a 
concept distinct from the concept of private rights of action."230 Never­
theless, in light of the Court's recent concern over maintaining proper 
limits upon the exercise of the judicial power,231 taking the same ap­
proach with regard to statutory standing as has been taken with regard 
to private rights of action would serve the separation-of-powers con­
cerns that have come to predominate the Court's standing jurispru­
dence. In fact, the Court's approach to analyzing whether or not 
Congress has intended to create a private right of action mirrors in 
many respects the Court's analysis of both whether a plaintiff has suf­
fered an injury cognizable under the statute in question and whether 
the plaintiff falls within the statute's intended zone of interests.232 The 
injury-in-fact even where Act itself granted to members of Congress the "right" to challenge 
statute in federal court). 
226. Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 473 (1957) 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("[W)e cannot argumentatively legislate for Congress when 
Congress has failed to legislate. To do so disrespects legislative responsibility and disregards 
judicial limitations."). 
227. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 717 ("When Congress intends private litigants to have a 
cause of action to support their statutory rights, the far better course is for it to specify as 
much when it creates those rights."). 
228. See, e.g., Women's Equity Action League v. Cavazos, 906 F.2d 742, 752 (D.C. Cir. 
1990) ("[The] generalized action plaintiffs pursue against federal executive agencies lacks 
the requisite green light from the legislative branch. We do not suggest that such an action 
could not be authorized. The courts, however, may not on their own initiative create the 
claim for relief. That authority resides in Congress." (internal citations omitted)). 
229. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001 ) (citing Touche Ross & Co. v. 
Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979)). 
230. Louisiana Landmarks Soc., Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 85 F.3d 11 19, 1122 n.3 (5th 
Cir. 1996). 
231. See supra note 223. 
232. Compare Touche Ross & Co., 442 U.S. at 579-80 (Brennan, J., concurring) (recog­
nizing that the preeminent factor in determining whether private cause of action was created 
is whether plaintiff is among "the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted"), 
with Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580 {1992) {Kennedy, J., concurring) (rec-
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key question in analyzing whether Congress has intended to create a 
private right of action is whether the plaintiff is "one of the class for 
whose especial benefit the statute was enacted."233 In analyzing statu­
tory standing within the framework of Article Ill's standing require­
ments, the Court has indicated that Congress must demonstrate its in­
tent to identify both the statutory injury and the class of persons 
entitled to enforce the statutory mandate.234 Even more clearly analo­
gous, the Court's zone-of-interests criterion asks the question whether 
the plaintiff is among those "protected or regulated by the statute or 
constitutional guarantee in question."235 Given the parallels between 
these two analyses, the lens used by the Court to evaluate questions of 
statutory standing should be at least as demanding as that used to 
evaluate questions surrounding private causes of action, as questions 
of standing go to the heart of the judicial power itself.236 
Applying this broader assertion to the more specific context of 
employment tester standing under Title VII and § 1981, standing for 
employment testers must be denied precisely because Congress has 
failed to evince its intention either to include testers within the class of 
plaintiffs whose injury is cognizable under Article III for Title VII 
purposes237 or to bring testers within the class to be protected by the 
terms of § 1981.238 Denying standing to employment testers thus serves 
the principle of separation of powers by avoiding the "overjudicializa­
tion of the processes of self-governance."239 Instead of creating judge­
made law in the statutory realm,240 refusing to grant standing to em­
ployment testers under the current statutory scheme places the onus 
of providing statutory protection to employment testers on the politi­
cal branches, the branches who should bear the ultimate responsibility 
in our system of divided powers for defining statutory rights and 
remedies.241 
ognizing need, under Article III, for Congress to "at the very least identify the injury it seeks 
to vindicate and relate the injury to the class of persons entitled to bring suit"), and Ass'n of 
Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 31J7 U.S. 150, 153 (11J70) (outlining the zone of inter­
ests test). 
233. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 ,  26 n.3 (1979); accord 
Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 189 (Scalia, J., concurring) (1988). 
234. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
235. Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. , 31J7 U.S. at 153. 
236. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. 
237. See supra notes 44-68, 90-98 and accompanying text. 
238. See supra notes 168-188 and accompanying text. 
239. Scalia, supra note 31, at 881. 
240. See supra note 226 and accompanying text. 
241. See JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, JOHN MARSHALL 109-10 (1901) ("[B)y adhering 
rigidly to its own duty, the court will help, as nothing else can, to fix the spot where respon­
sibility lies, and to bring down on that precise locality the thunderbolt of popular condemna­
tion . . . .  For that course - the true course of judicial duty always - will powerfully help to 
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B. Recognizing Congressional Responsibility 
In addition to executing its proper role in the tripartite system of 
federal governance, by denying standing to employment testers the 
Judiciary would also be taking notice of Congress's proven ability to 
clarify and expand legislation, especially in the area of civil rights, in 
response to judicial pronouncements.242 In fact, the Court has recog­
nized that Congress has the power to refine and create statutory bases 
for standing where the Court has not previously found a sufficient 
foundation on which to rest standing.243 
Congress has not failed to take note of the Court's invitations.244 
With passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, for example, Congress 
acted to supersede Court rulings that had narrowly interpreted Title 
VII and § 1981.245 In Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,246 the Court 
altered the burden upon the defendant in a disparate impact case un­
der Title VII, holding that an employer need only provide evidence 
that its employment practice is legitimate to rebut plaintiff's disparate 
impact claim and that the employer's burden on this point would be 
one of production rather than persuasion.247 In Patterson v. McLean 
bring the people and their representatives to a sense of their own responsibility."); see also 
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 559-60 ("Obviously, then, the Constitution's central mechanism of separa­
tion of powers depends largely upon common understanding of what activities are appropri­
ate to legislatures, to executives, and to courts."). 
242. Cf Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 425 (1988) (declining to create Bivens-style 
damages remedy against federal officials under Title II of Social Security Act due to, inter 
alia, frequent congressional attention to issues surrounding Act). 
243. Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973) ("Congress may enact stat­
utes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing, even though no injury 
would exist without the statute."); see also Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578 ("Nothing in this [opinion] 
contradicts the principle that (t]he . . .  injury required by Art. III  may exist solely by virtue of 
statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing.") (internal quotations 
and citations omitted). 
244. See, for example, the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 
107 Stat. 31 (codified as amended at scattered sections of 20 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C. 
(1994)), which, inter alia, amended Title IX to reflect Congress's belief that a finding of dis­
crimination in any program within an institution permitted the Department of Education to 
terminate applicable federal funding to the entire institution, legislatively overruling Grove 
City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984); the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. 
No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1994)), in which Congress re­
sponded to the Court's determination in Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 145-46 
(1976), that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy was not impermissible sex discrimina­
tion under Title VII; and the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 
94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1994)), which responded to 
the Court's refusal to award attorney's fees in contravention of the "American rule" in 
Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 263 (1975). 
245. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified in scat­
tered sections of 42 U.S.C. (1994)). 
246. 490 U.S. 642 (1989). 
247. Id. at 650-51.  
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Credit Union,248 the Court determined that § 1981's protection against 
racial discrimination in the "making and enforcement" of contracts did 
not extend to on-the-job discrimination after the initial contract for­
mation.249 The 1991 Act specifically responded to the Wards Cove de­
cision, naming the decision in the Act and including provisions specifi­
cally directed at reversing the Court's holding.250 The Act also 
supplanted Patterson by redefining the "making and enforcement of 
contracts" in § 1981 to include "performance, modification, and termi­
nation of contracts" within its ambit.251 
These instances illustrate both the power and the attention of 
Congress in the area of civil rights. Supporters of standing for em­
ployment testers need not fear that adverse judicial pronouncements 
will forever doom their prospects for creating a statutory haven for 
tester activities. Congress has the ability and has evinced the will to 
amend civil rights statutes to effect its intent where the courts have 
adopted limiting constructions of civil rights legislation. Moreover, as 
the branch invested with the will of the people, the legislature's pro­
nouncements more accurately reflect the societal purposes of civil 
rights legislation than the countermajoritarian visions of the judges 
and justices of the federal Judiciary. 
CONCLUSION 
While this Note does not argue that society should tum a blind eye 
to the effects of discrimination even upon employment testers, this 
Note illustrates that the legal system was not designed to provide 
automatic protection to members of protected classes from all in­
stances of discrimination. An employment tester must rely on either a 
constitutional or statutory basis in which to ground her standing. This 
Note shows, however, that neither Title VII nor § 1981 provides such a 
foundation for employment tester standing. 
While Title VII and § 1981 aim broadly at the effects of discrimina­
tion in the field of employment, neither the statutory text nor congres­
sional intent behind either Title VII or § 1981 reveal an intent to in­
clude testers in the umbrella of statutory protection or the statutory 
zone of interests. Moreover, the policy arguments proffered by sup­
porters of standing fail to address the fatal lack of a proper statutory 
basis for standing under either Title VII or § 1981. Finally, this Note 
shows that denying tester standing serves the important interest in 
separation of powers that the Court has made central to the standing 
248. 491 U.S. 164 (1989). 
249. Id. at 171. 
250. Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 2. 
251. 42 u.s.c. § 1981(b) (1994). 
272 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 101 :235 
analysis. By denying standing to employment testers, the courts will 
give respect to the principles of standing in the employment law con­
text while also maintaining the proper balance of power between the 
Judiciary and the Legislature. 
